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A trade name of a firm is property, and no other persons, without the firm's consent, and not having the same name, can use it in trade to the disadvantage or injury
of such firm.
Such trade name may be assigned to a successor firm, which thereby obtains the
same rights in said name as its predecessor had.
A dealer in a commodity identical in manufacture and charaqter with that dealt
in by such firm and its successor, will be enjoined from the sale of such commodity in a wrapper countersigned with such trade name without authority, even though
the dealer purchased the commodity from the original manufacturers, who were
the trade name to such of their products as were designed for
authorized to affix
such firm.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
DANIELS, J.-The plaintiffs, as the successors of the firm of
Howard, Sanger & (Jo., have prosecuted this action to restrain the
defendants from selling Low's Brown Windsor Soap in packages
countersigned with the firm name of Howard, Sanger & Co. The
last named firm on the 15th day of March 1878, entered into an
agreement with Low, Son & Haydon, of London, in England, for
the sale of their soap. The agreement by its terms was to extend
to the 1st of April 1881, and it included all the soap of the manufacturers which should be sold in the United States; and when
it should be supplied for sale the wrapper containing it was to be
At
countersigned with the name of "Howard, Sanger & Co."
the time when this firm of Howard, Sanger & Co. went out of
business three of its members retired, while the plaintiffs, who were
also members of that firm, formed a new copartnership for the continuance of the business. This new firm bought out its predecessors,
including in the purchase the right to use the name of the old firm
and continue the contracts entered into by it, and particularly
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that made with Low, Son & Haydon. This purchase operated as
an assignment of the contract to the plaintiffs with the right to
use the name of the prior firm by countersigning the packages
of soap in controversy; and, as that was shortly afterward practically acquiesced in by the manufacturers of the soap, it was
sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to the exclusive right to use the
name of the firm of Howard, Sanger & Co. in connection with
the sale of this manufacture of soap in the United States. For
rights of this nature have been h~ld to be transferable by assignment: Congress, &c., Spring Co. v. High Rock Congress Spring
Go., 45 N. Y. 291, 302; lfeJLean v. Pleming, 96 U. S. 245,
249; Kidd v. Johnson, 100 Id. 617; ifuwer v. Dannenhoffer,
82 N. Y. 499, 502.
The plaintiffs in this manner having become entitled to use the
name of this preceding firm for the purpose of countersigning the
wrappers in which the soap was to be put, stand substantially in
the same position as the preceding firm itself did. That firm was
the exclusive owner of this name. It had a property in it, which
no other persons without its consent, not having the same names,
could either deprive it of or use in trade to the disadvantage or
injury of the firm whose name it was. It was an element of property, inasmuch as it became identified with its trade, which it
was entitled exclusively to use and enjoy as long as no other concern having the same name appeared to challenge that exclusive
right; .Phelan v. Collender, 6 Hun 244; Devlin v. Devlin, 69
N. Y. 212; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige 75; Mleneely v. Meneely, 62
N. Y. 427. This name, as it had been used, bad become identified with the sales of this soap in the United States. The trade
was shown to have been an extensive one, valuable in its results to
the parties through whose agency it was carried on. And while,
by the terms of the agreement made with the manufacturers, it
was to be placed upon all the packages of this soap sent into the
United States, the general stipulation on the subject was not
intended to include soap sold or sent to other dealers. For by the
other terms and provisions contained in the contract it appears to
have been clearly contemplated that these packets should all find
their way into the hands of dealers in the United States only
through the agency of this firm of Howard, Sanger & Co. By
the other provisions in the contract this firm was constituted and
appointed the sole agents of the manufacturers for the sale of their
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soap here, and it was to identify and confine the sale of such soap to
that agency that the packets were to be countersigned with its
name.
Under these provisions the manufacturers of the soap acquired
no authority to place the name of its agency in the United States
upon packets of soap not sent to that agency under the terms of
the agreement. No license to use the name in any way differing
from that was contemplated by the terms of the instrument executed
by the parties. But, the agreenient, on the other hand, was that
the firm of Howard, Sanger & Co. should be constituted the sole
agents of the manufacturers for the sale of their soap in the United
States, and that the soap put up for that purpose should be countersigned in their name. No right or license to use this name for
any other purpose whatever was acquired under the agreement, by
the manufacturers; and consequently, the firm of Howard, Sanger
& Co. still continued, after the agreement was made, entitled to
all their proprietary rights in this matter, and by the transfer of
its business to the plaintiffs in this case, the latter succeeded to the
same rights.
It was shown by the evidence in the case that the defendants
received the soap offered for sale and sold by them, through an
agent acting in their behalf, directly from the manufacturers.
When it was delivered to them, the packages were countersigned
with the name of Howard, Sanger & Co. in precisely the same*
manner as that which was sent directly to the manufacturers' agents.
While the manufacturers were at liberty to violate the terms of the
contract with their agent, and sell the soap manufactured by them
to other persons dealing with them, they had no authority to
countersign the packages in this manner. For that not only
involved the violation of the terms and spirit of the contract, but
in addition to that a misappropriation of the firm name of the
agency. The soap which passed into the hands of the defendants
was the property of the manufacturers, and they could sell and
transfer the title to it to any person dealing with them, for, by the
agreement which they had made, they had not divested themselves
of their title to such portions of their property. To that extent
their rights are entirely different from those affecting the firm name
of the agency. While as incidental to their right of property in
the soap, they could sell and transfer it to whomsoever they chose,
they manifestly could not do so with this name, for they had no
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such right, title or interest in it. That, on the contrary, continued
to be the property of the agents, and inasmuch as the manufacturers had no other control over it than to place it upon packages
of the soap sent to this agency, they could not lawfully place it
upon packages of soap sold or delivered to other dealers. To that
extent, therefore, the proprietary rights secured to the plaintiffs
were violated in the delivery of the packages of soap sold to the
defendants, and to restrain such a violation is one of the proper
offices of an injunction.
At the time when the defendants commenced their purchases
of soap from these manufacturers, they appear to have been guided
by no improper motives whatever in doing so, and, as the "name
of Howard, Sanger & Co. was upon packages as they came from
the hands of the manufacturers, they were right in supposing that
it had been used with authority in that manner, and so, because
they dealt in the article under that conviction, no just complaint
could be made of their conduct. But on the 8th day of December 1879, the plaintiffs' exclusive right to the use of this
name was brought to the attention of the defendants, and after
they had been so notified of the facts it became their duty to
desist from selling the soap countersigned with the name of this
agency.
The information which was then given to them was a sufficient
disclosure of the facts to render them chargeable with knowledge
of the terms of the contract under which this exclusive agency
had been formed. For it had been made their duty to inquire
what were the terms of the agreement that had been made, if they
desired further information upon this subject. And their failure to
make the inquiry here subjects them to all the responsibilities
arising from the acquisition of such knowledge as would have been
obtained if the inquiry had actually been: made. From the time
such notice was received, the defendants consequently had no right
to use this soap with the name of Howard, Sanger & Co. upon the
package.
And to the extent of restraining the use of that name in the
sale made of the soap by the defendants, the action ought to have
been sustained. But as to the right of the defendants to purchase
this soap of Low, Son & Haydon, and make sales of it in the
United States, the case stands upon a different footing. For the
soap itself was still the property of the manufacturers, notwith-
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standing the agreement which they had made, and it was, therefore,
capable of being sold by them and the title to it transferred to the
defendants. For that reason the latter had the right to sell it
again notwithstanding the fact that the manufacturers in selling
it to them had violated the terms of their agreement made with
Howard, Sanger & Co. The plaintiffs Were not entitled, therefore,
to restrain the defendants. from either purchasing the soap from
these manufacturers or selling it again in the course of their business; neither could they be required to surrender the wrappers in
which the soap had been packed. All that they should have been
prohibited from doing was the sale of the soap in the wrappers in
which it was placed, with the name of Howard, Sanger & Co. upon
them. That under the circumstances they have no right to do,
for the reason that it violated the plaintiff's property in that name.
By the erasure of that name from the packages, and the sale of
the soap in that manner, no propriety right of the plaintiffs will be
violated. And to that extent the defendants are entitled to make
this soap an article of traffic in their business.
The facts that have been found will probably require no further
trial of this action for the purpose of determining the rights of the
parties. But for the purpose of protecting these rights, the judgment which has been recovered should be reversed, and a judgment
directed for the purpose of enjoining and prohibiting the sale of
this soap by the defendants with the name of Howard, Sanger &
Co. upon the packages. And as that is much less than the plaintiffs themselves have claimed during the progress of this litigation,
and it is all that they appear to be entitled to, the judgment should
be without costs to either party.
No question of registralion appears to
have been raised in this case,. probably
because according to the Act of Congress
(March 3d 1881) sect.,a, "no alleged
trademark which is merely the name of
the applicant shall be registered." All
previous congressional legislation on the
subject of the registration of trademarks,
to wit, the Acts of 1870 and 1876, was
declared by the Supreme Court of the
United States in UnitedStates v. Steffens,
100 U. S.82, to be unconstitutional, and
according to the decision of the court upon
that occasion, "the whole legislation

must fall, as being void for want of constitutional authority." See 20 Am. Law
Reg. 305.
The Act of March 3d 1881 avoids the
rock upon which the first and only attempt to requate tieriqit of tradernarks,
viz., the Act of 1870, was wrecked.
That act had assumed to grant protection, by the registration of a trademark,
to anybody in the United States, and
anybody in any foreign country which
permits the like ; and the remedies provided when the right of the owner of the
trademark is infringed are not confined
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to the case of a trademark used in foreign or inter-state commerce or commerce
with the Indian tribes, but the words are
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace
commerce or traffic between citizens of
the same state, which is beyond the
power of Congress and an invasion of
state rights.
The Act of 1881 enacts that "owners
of trademarks used in commerce with
foreign nations, or with the Indian
tribes," &c., "may obtain registration
of such trademarks by complying with
the following requirements," &e. Thus
the question of commerce between owners of trademarks in the same state is
judiciously avoided, and even the registration of trademarks used in inter-state
commerce is not provided for. By the
4th section it is provided that certificates
of such iegistration shall be evidence in
any suit in which such trademarks shall
ne brought in controversy, and further,
that copies of trademarks and of statements and declarations filed therewith
shall be received as evidence in any such
suit, but there is no attempt to make such
The owners
registration obligatory.
must, however, either be " domiciled in
the United States or located in any foreign country, or tribes which by treaty,
convention or law, affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States."
By sect. 7, the "registration of a trademark shall be prima facie evidence of
or
ownership," and counterfeiting
wrongfully using a registered trademark
shall render the aggressor liable to an
action for damages and to a suit in
equity to enjoin from the wrongful use
of such trademark used in foreign commerce, &c., and to recover compensation
therefor, and the courts of the United
States shall have original and appellate
jurisdiction in such cases. But by sect.
10, " nothing in this act shall prevent,
lessen or impeach any remedy at lw or
in equity which any party aggrieved by
any wrongful use of any trademark
might have had if the provisions of this
VOL. SXX.-82

act had not been passed." In other
words the common-law remedies remain
intact, and the common-law right to a
trademark is in itself inalienable. See
20 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 313.
A trade name is in the case before us
acknowledged to be a trademark although
the Act of 1881 does not permit of its
registration, and such trade name may
be assigned to a successor who thereby
obtains the same rights as his predecessor
had, but no other person not having the
same name can use it in trade to the disadvantage or injury of the original owner
or his assignee. But further, this case
has decided that a dealer in a commodity
identical in manufacture and character,
and even obtained from the same manufacturer, vill be enjoined from the sale
of such commodity countersigned without authority with such trade name, in
an action brought by the successor of the
And this though
original proprietor.
such dealer purchased said commodity
bearing such countersign in good faith
from the manufacturer who was authorized to affix the trade name to such products as were designed exclusively for
said proprietor and his successor. And
lastly, the violation by the manufacturers
of their contract with the assigiiees and
their predecessors, although the said manufacturers transferred a good title in the
article to the defendants, and the latter
could not be restrained from selling the
article itself, would, nevertheless, entitle the plaintiffs to a perpetual injunction
against the defendants restraining them
from selling the said manufactured article
in packages bearing the trade name of
its original owner or his successor, especially after they had been notified of the
of
facts, notwithstanding the bona fides
the defendants in their original transacAs -Mr.
tion with the manufacturers.
Upton observes, a trademark consists of
"ca right of property in a mere name, figure, letter-mark, device or symbol, when
It
used as a designation of a thing."
exists " at common law, independent of
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all statute provisions which (recognising
its existence and the great importance
of its protection beyond that afforded it
by courts of civil jurisdiction) inflict the
penalties of a misdemeanor upon its violation :" Upton's Trearise on the Law
of Trademarks, pp. 14, 15.
Whilst on the subject of the use of a
trade name as a trademark it may not he
amiss to refer to a case iecently decided
in England, in which a family name as
affixed to a particular secret manufacture
The case
became matter of litigation.
referred to is that of the Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, 44 L. T. R. 888,
being an appeal by defendant from the
judgment of BACON, V. C., Dec. 14th
1880.
The plaintiffs were a company incorporated by the legislature of the state of
New Jersey, U. S., under the above
style, with a factory in Glasgow, and
they claimed, as successors in the business to the firm of Singer & Co., to be
entitled to all such interest in and benefit of the name of Singer as their predecessors in the business were entitled to.
In an action to restrain the use by the
defendant of the plaintifis' trade name,
the issues were whether the name was a
designation of machines of the plaintiffs'
manufacture, or of machines of a particular kind of construction; whether the
defendant had used the name for the purpose of appropriating the reputation acquired by machines manufactured by the
plaintiffs' company or not; and whether
the defendant had, by using the name,
induced purchasers to believe they were
buying machines manufactured by the
Defendant, who
plaintiffs' company.
sold (as wholesale agent in London of a
company in Berlin) to persons in the
trade only, described his machines in his
circulars and price lists as machines
manufactured on the "Singer" system,
or the " Singer improved system," and
by his statement of defence alleged, that
as the plaintiffs' patent had long since
lapsed, they were not sntitled to any

monopoly of the right of advertising or
selling machines manufactured on what
was known in the trade as the " Singer
System." Held (reversing the decision
of BACON, V. C.), that the plaintiffs'
company had no exclusive right to se
the word "Singer," as applied to sewingmachines, and that there was nothing is
the defendant's circular, price-lists and
invoices calculated to deceive and induce
purchasers to believe they were buying
machines manufactured by the plaintiffs.
JAMES, COTTON and LUSH, L. JJ., were
unanimous in overruling the injunction
granted by BACON, V. C. At the same
time it is only right to remark that they
none 'f them treated the word " Singer"
as a trademark, but simply as descriptive
of the kind of machine by whomsoever
made. Indeed the plaintiffs had a separate trademark of metal containing the
word "Singer," with a device which the
defendant had to some extent imitated,
but abandoned it at an emly stage of
the suit and undertook never to use it
again.
In the " Singer" Macline Afanjfacturers v. William NYewton Wilson, L.
R., 2 Ch. Div. 434, it was held, in effect,
on appeal, affirming the decree of the
Master of the Bolls dismissing the bill,
that "when a manufacturer A. (Singer) has acquired a reputation in the
market, so that the goods made by him
are commonly known by his name, but
is not possessed of any patent, a rival
manufacturer B. (Wilson) being entitled to imitate his goods, is entitled
also, provided that he does not place
his name on his own goods, to advertise his goods and offer them for sale
by the name of A. (Singer), if he takes
care to state clearly at the same time
that the goods which he sells are manu-

factured by himself:"

JAMEs, MELLISH

That case
and BAGGALLAT, L. J.
was subsequently reversed in thq House
of Lords (1877), but without prejudice
to any question in the case, in the event
of further evidence being given, which
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was thereby authorized : 3 Appeal Cases
376. The Singer company claimed the
name" Singer" as a trademark, and the
House adjudged that fraud was not
necessary to be averred or proved in
order to obtain protection for a trademark ; but that if the defendant's advertisements wer6 calculated to mislead an
unwary purchaser into the belief that he
was purchasing machines manufactured
and sold by the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs were prima fade entitled to an injunction, although there was not actual
intent to deceive.
The English cases are numerous to the
same effect and date from an early period
to the present time. In Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293, Lord IANSuiEain
said, "If the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff's
name or mark, that would be a fraud for
which an action would lie. But here
both plaintiff and defendant used the
name of the original inventor, and no
evidence was given of the defendant having sold it as if prepared by the plaintiff. The only other ground on which
the action could be maintained was
that of the property in the plaintiff,
which was not pretended, there being
no patent, nor any letters of administration." In this case there was no
evidence of the plaintiff's exclusive right
to the name "Dr. Johnson's Yellow
Ointment," or the mark which both
plaintiff and defendant used alike.
In Carnhamv. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. 218,
PLUM2R, V. C., said, " The bill proceeds upon an erroneous notion of exclusive property now subsisting in this medicine which Swainson (the original purchaser of the recipe) had a right to
dispose of by will, and, as it is contended, to give to the plaintiff the exclusive right of sale. If this claim of
monopoly can be maintained, without
any limitation of time, it is a much better right than that of a patent." * * *
The vice chancellor concluded thus:
"The defendant does not hold himself

out as the representative of Swainson,
setting up a right in that character to
the medicine purchased by him, but
merely represents that he sells, not the
plaintiff's medicine, but one of as good
a quality. He is peifectly at liberty to
do so. If any exclusive right in this
medicine ever existed it has long sii ce
expired."
And yet in this case both
plaintiff and defendant used the same
name to designate the medicine, viz.:
"Nelm's Vegetable Syrup," and the
defendant represented that his medicine was precisely the same as that
made and sold by the late Mr. Swainson.
In Leather Cloth Co.v. American Leather
Cloth Co., 11 Jur. (N. S.) 513, Lord
CANwoRaT, inter alia, said, "Difficul-

ties however may arise where the trademark consists merely of the name of the
manufacturer. When he dies those who
succeed him (grandchildren or married
daughters, for instance) though theymay
not bear the same name, yet ordinarily
continue to use the original name as a
trademark ; and they would be protected
against any infringement of the exclusive
right to that mark. They would be so
protected because, according to the ways
of the trade, they would be understood
as meaning no more by the use of their
grandfather's or father's name than that
they were carrying on the manufacture
formerly carried on by him. Nor would
the case be necessarily different, if, instead of passing into other hands by de.
volution of law, the manufactory were
sold and assigned to a purchaser. The
question in every such case must be whether the purchaser, in continuing the
use of the original trademark, would,
according to the ordinary usages of the
trade, be understood as saying more
than that he was carrying on the same
business as had been formerly carried on
by the person whose name constituted
the trademark."
This appears to define tersely and lucidly the object of such a trademark and
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the amount of protection to which it is
entitled.
In Burgess v. Burgess, 17 Jur. 292,
the plaintiff and defendant were both
of the same name, and indeed were
father and son. The question of a tradename as a trademark could scarcely be
said to be at issue.
They both sold a
fish sauce under the name of "Burgess's Essence of AnchoA ies," which description had been originally adopted by
the father of the plaintiff and grandfather of the Uefendant. In giving the
opinion of the Court of Appeal, the
vice chancellor having refused an injunction and the appeal therefrom being dismissed, KXIGHT BRucn, L. J., rather
facetiously, as was his wont, avoided the
difficulty thus: "All tle queen's subjeets have a right, if they will, to manufacture and sell pickles and sauces, and
not the less that their fathers have done
so before them.
All the queen's subjects have a right to sell them in their
own name, and not the less so that they
bear the same name as their father; and
nothing else has been done in that which
is the question before us. * * * He
(the defendant) carries on business un.
der his own name, and dells essence of
anchovy as 'Burgess's Essence of Anchovy,' which it is. * * * The only
ground of complaint is the great celebrity which, during many years, has
been possessed by the elder Mr. Burgess's essence of anchovy.
that does
not give him such exclusive right, such
a monopoly, such a privilege, as to
prevent any man from making essence
of anchovy and selling it under his
own name."
It should be added that
the vice chancellor, though he refused
to restrain the defendant from selling the same under the Vame of "Burgess," had granted the injunction stopping the defendant from appending to
the description the words "late of 107
Strand," the original place of business
and where the plaintiff still continued
.the business. Thus the sting was taken

out of the case before it went up to the
Court of Appeal, the disuse of words
thus indicating the defendant to be the
same man and conducting the same business as "late of 107 Strand" being enjoined in the decree.
In James v. James, L. B., 13 Eq.
421, it was held by Lord RoMrLaY,
M. R., that " any person who has, without the use of unfair means, become
acquainted with the mode of compounding a secret unpatented medicine or
preparation, may, after the death of the
original discoverer, make and sell the
conpound, describing it by the name of
the discoverer, provided he does not lead
the public to suppose that his preparation
is the manufacture of the successors in
business of the original discoverer ; but
he must not assert that his is the only
genuine article, or suggest that the article manufactured by the successors of
the original discoverer is spurious."
In Massam v. Thorley's C. F. Co., 6
Ch. Div. 574, it was held by AIALINs,
V. C., that " any person who has become acquainted with the process of
manufacturing an article which is in general secret, is entitled to manufacture it;
and if the name of the first manufacturer
has become attached to the article, any
person afterwards manufacturing is entitled to describe it by the name of such
original manufacturer, and if he happens
to be of the same name as the original
manufacturer lie may use his name in
describing his business, or allow it to be
used by a company formed by him for
the purpose of carrying on the business,
notwithstanding that the manufacturers
continue to carry on the old manufacture
under the old name."
This decision
seems to be in accord with that of Burgess v. Burgess, supra.
In Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Oh. Div.
850, S. Cheavin and his son G. Cheavin
manufactured and sold filterers which had
been patented by the father, under the
title and marked with the label as '! S.
Cheavin's Improved Patent Gold Medal
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Self-cleaning Rapid Water Filterers."
After the father died and the patent
expired, G. Cheavin substituted his
name in the place of his father's, and
continued the manufacture and sale
under that name, above which was a
medallion containing the royal arms,
surmounted by the words " Her
Majesty's Royal Letters Patent." The
defendant, who had been in the employ
of G. Cheavin, began manufacturing
and selling in the same town on his
own account filterers similar in appearance to G. Cheavin's, and inscribed
with "S. Cheavin's Patent Prize Medal
Self-cleaning Rapid Water Filterers, Improved and Manufactured by Walker,
Brightman & Co. ;" and it was held by
the Court of Appeal, reversing the vicechancellor's decision, "First, that the
label used by the plaintiff was not a
trade-mark, but only a description of
the article as made according to S.
Cheavin's patent, which, having expired, was common to all the public.
Secondly, that there was nothing in the
defendant's label calculated to mislead
the public by a fraudulent imitation of
the plaintiff's label. Thirdly, that the
plaintiff's label, coupled with the medallion of the royal arms, constituted a
false representation that the patent was
still existing, and disentitled the plaintiff to relief by injunction."
With respect to label. In Farinav.
Silverlock, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 214, it
was held by. Lord Chancellor CRAwwoRTH that "in a case where the mark
consisted of a label in a certain form,
and it was shown that in very many
instances labels the same as or similar
to it might be sold for a legitimate purpose, the court, in the absence of any
proof of actual fraud, refused to restrain the printing and sale of such
labels until the manufacturer, who alleged that they were use I for a fraudulent purpose, had established his case by
an action at law."
Numerous English cases might be

cited to the effect that an injunction
ought not to he granted, it not being
perfectly clear that the plaintiff had a
legal right to the mark of which it was
alleged that the defendant's was a false
See Spottiswoode v.
representation.
Clark, 10 Jur. 1043. Especially where
the plaintiff is himself seeking to deceive the public: Pidding Y. How, 8
Simons 477 ; Motley v. Downman, 3
My. & Cr. 1 ; Clark v. Freeman,
11 Beav. 112; lavell v. Harrison, 17
Jur. 368 ; Perry v. Trueffitt, 6 Bear. 66.
In Marshall v. PinlJnta, 52 Wis.
572 (1881),

CASSADAY,

J., delivered

the opinion of the court, that the proper name of the manufacturer of an
article cannot be made a trade-mark so
as to prevent any other manufacturer
from affixing such name to a similar
article made and sold by him, where no
unfair means are used to mislead purchasers into a belief that such article is
manufactured by the person who first
sold and continues to sell a like article
"A trade-mark,"
under that name.
says CAssmxn&Y, J., "performs a distinctive office. As such its use may be
protected by the courts. But this does
not authorize a monopoly upon fragments of the language, nor the exclusive appropriation of words in common
use descriptive of common objects and
qualities. It has often been decided
that words which are merely descriptive
of the kind, nature, style, character or
quality of the goods or articles sold cannot be exclusively appropriated and protected as a trade-mark."
He then proceeds to cite Caswell v.
Davis, 58 N. Y. 223, where it was held
that "words or phrases of common use,
and which indicate the character, kind,
quality and composition of an article of
manufacture, cannot be appropriated by
the manufacturer exclusively to his own
use as a trade-mark."
To the same effect he cites Taylor v.
Gillies, 59.N.Y. 331. Also, Canal Co
v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311 ; Perryv. True-
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fitt, 6 Beav. 66; Corwin v. Daly, 7
Bosw. 222 ; Williams %. Johnson, 2 Id.
1; Amoskeag Mfanuf. Co. v. Spear, 2
Sandf. (S. 0.) 599; Ftridgev. Wells,
13 How. Pr. 387-8; Partridge v.
31enck, 2 Barb. Oh. 101; Popham v.
Cole, 66 N. Y. 69. "From these
authorities," he continues, "it is evident that the words 'E.heumatic Liniment,' 'Celebrated Liniment,' and the
other words in the label in question, descriptive of the liniment sold, could not
be appropriated as a trade-mark."
Mlr. Browne, in his treatise, thus
states the rule : " The right to the use
of the mark must be exdusive of all
other persons.
A trade-mark is an
emblem of a man just as much as his
written signature, and is used to denote
that an article of merchandise has been
made by a certain person, or that it has
been sold or offered for sile by him. If
the same mark were to be used by different persons for the same species of goods,
it would lead to inextricible confusion,
and its true and legitimath purpose
would be overthrown, for then it would
lack the essential element of an indication of origin or owncrship :" Sect.
303.
In the Wisconsin case of Marshall v.
Pinkham, supra, the subject of the exclusive use of a proper name of the
manufacturer of an article is elaborately
and exhaustively discussel in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice CASSADAY,
and the cases we have referred to are
ably commented on. In that case the
label described the manufactured article
as " Old Dr. S. Marshall's Celebrated
Liniment," and contained other words
and a vignette, &c. No unfair means
had been resorted to by the defendant to
mislead purchasers into a belief that the
article sold by him was manufactured
by the person who first sold and continue to sell a like article under that
name.
11It seems to be the office pf a trademark to point out the true source, origin

or ownership of the goods to which the
mark is applied, or to point out and
designate a dealer's place of business,
distinguishing it from the business locality of other dealers. Such is substantially the rule laid down by many
authorities." Per CASSADAY, J. Dunbarv. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118; Gillott v.
Esterbrook, 48 N. Y. 374 ; Amoskeag
M3anuf. Co. v. Spear, supra; Fetridge
v. Wells, supra; Barrows v. Knight, 6
R. I. 434; filley v. Fassett, 44 Mo.
168 ; Boardman v. 31eriden Britannia
Co., 35 Conn. 402.
"The
words
'Marshall's
Liniment,'
' Marshall's
Rheumatic Liniment,'
uMarshall's Celebrated Liniment,' ' Old Dr. S. Marshall's Celebrated Liniment,' used in
the various labels before us," continues
the learned judge, "could only therefore be protected as trade-marks in so
far as they pointed out Marshall or old
Dr. S. Marshall as the true originator
or owner of the liniment to which they
were attached." Further on the learned
judge remarks: "It would also seem
to follow, from the cases cited, that on
the death of old Samuel M[arshall (assuming that no one succeeded to the
good will or the business), any citizen
would have the legal right to manufacture liniment composed of the same
ingredients and made in the same way
as he manufactured that sold by him,
and also in making sales, to describe it
as such. Upon that assumption the
words ' Old Dr. S. Marshall's Celebrated Liniment' were merely descriptive of the compound, and if truthfully applied by the defendant in
making sales, no one could rightly
complain, as no one bad any patent
upon it or exclusive right to the use of
any words which aptly described it.
Upon his death, with no successor to
the good will of his business, those
words would cease to indicate origin
or ownership, and hence cease to be a
trade-mark."
In the principal case the court has gone
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the length of deciding that a trade-name
may be assigned to a successor firm,
which thereby obtains the same rights in
said name as its predecessor had. The
peculiarity in this case is that the proprietors of the trade-name in question
were not the manufacturers of the article to which it was affixed, but simply
agents for the United States for the sale
)fan article manufactured by Low, Son
and Haydon, of London, England. For
the sale of the latter's Brown Windsor
Soap, they made a contract by which Low
& Co. agreed to countersign each packet
of said soap exclusively designed for the
said agents, with the name " Howard,
Sanger & Co." in the form of the signature of the said firm. That firm was
the exclusive owner of this name. "It
bad," in the words of DAN ELS, J.,
"a property in it which no other person
without its consent, not having the same
name, could either deprive it of or use
in trade to the disadvantage or injury
of the firm whose name it was. It was
an element of property, inasmuch as it
became identified with its trade, which
it was entitled exclusively to use and
enjoy as long as no other concern having the same name appeared to challenge
that exclusive right :" Plielan v. Collender, 6 Hun 244; Devlin v. Devlin, 69
N. Y. 212 ; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige 75 ;
.Aleneely v. Jlfeneely, 62 N. Y. 427.
The name could not be said, as in the
case of Lea 6- Perrins v. Deakin, U. S.
C. C., Illinois N. D., 18 Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 322, to have become generic.

In that case Judge DRU3IOND

refused to restrain the use of the word
"Worcestershire," as applied to a sauce,
not only on the above ground, but because persons residing at a place of that
name in England, and who there mannfactured and sold the sauce, did not
thereby acquire the exclusive use of the
name as a trade-mark. An injunction
had previously been refused by Sir
George JESSEL, Master of the Rolls,
from whose decree (1876) no appeal

was lodged. On the contrary, it appears
to have been acquiesced in.
The remarkable feature in the principal
case, consists in the fact that there was
no attempted injunction as to the manufactured article itself, the same soap
being supplied to both parties alike.
There was no attempt on the part of
the defendants to pass off their goods as
those of the plaintiffs, and therefore it is
that the defendants were only enjoined
to discontinue the use of the plaintiffs'
wrappers, with the name of Howard,
Sanger & Co. upon them, which had
been furnished them through a breach
of the contract between the manufacturers of the soap and the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, as the court observed,
were not entitled to restrain the defendants from either purchasing the soap
from these manufacturers or selling it
again in the course of their business.
Neither could they be required to surrender the wrappers in which the soap
The proprietary
had been packed.
rights of the plaintiffs had been violated in the delivery of the packages of
soap sold to the defendants with the
plaintiffs' name on such packages.
Originally the defendants were actuated by no improper motives, rightly
supposing that the name of plaintiffs had
been used with authority by the manufacturers. But when notified that the
plaintiffs were entitled to the "eclusive
use of that name they should have desisted from selling the soap countersigned with the name of the agency.
In the case of the Singer lanuf. Co. v.
Loag, supra, J'MES, L. J., remarked:
"I am of opinion that there is no such
thing as a monopoly or a property in
the nature of a copyright, or in the
nature of a patent, in the use of any
name. Whatever name is used to designate goods, anybody may use that name
to designate goods ; always subject to
this, that he must not, as I said, make
directly, or through the medium of another person, a false representation that
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his goods are the goods of another person. That I take to be the law. I am
of opinion that the label was calculated
to deceive, and was calculated to make
a false representation as between somebody who did not know who the real
manufacturer was and his vendor."
This, however, could not be said of the
principal case. The lalel, in that case,
was the same and the manufactured
article the same.
Let us see how far Lusi, L. J., endorses the sentiments of Lord Justice
LJAis : "We are not dealing with the
validity of a patent. The plaintiffs
have no monopoly in -he manufacture
of sewing machines ; the patents which
they had expired some years ago, and it
is now open to all the world to make the
identical machines which they make, and
to imitate theirs in every particular. Nor
have they any right of property in the
name "Singer," in the sense in which
they seek to use it, nama1y, in the sense
that they can restrain every competitor
from using the word "Singer" as descriptive of the kind of machine, however he may qualify or explain it.
What they have a right to require is
that which is common to every manufacturer of goods, namely, that no competitor shall be at libery to attempt to
put off goods of his own manufacture as
being goods of the manufacture of another. That is the right whiich they
have, and no other; and the question
here is, has the defendant, in his mode
of carrying on his business, represented
in any way to those who buy his machines that they are buying the machines
which are the manufacture of the Singer
Manufacturing Company ? If he has,
then he is guilty of a fraud towards the
buyer, because upon that supposition he
has misled the buyer, and he has at the
same time been guilty of a fraud towards the Singer Manufacturing Company, because upon the same hypothesis
he has deprived them of a customer;
but if he has not, it does not signify

that he has sold identically the same
machines, or that he has put a name
upon them whiuh is the same name they
use, if he takes care that lie does not
so use that name or word as to convey
to the buyer the meaning that they have
been manufactured by that other company."
In the principal case, if the plaintiffs endeavored to convey by the labels
marked with their name that they
were the manufacturers of the soap in
question they were themselves deceiving
the public, and would have had no title
to relief in equity. It might have been
an innocent deception, as they obtained
and sold the real article, but it was qn act
that might at any time be seriously perverted. The defendants appear to have
proceeded one step more by using the
plaintiffs' labels, as supplied them by
the manufacturers, and thereby, however innocently, doubly deceived the public, but without inflicting public injury,
for like the plaintiffs, they sold the real
article, " Low's Brown Windsor Soap."
Doubtless the plaintiffs were damnifled by the loss of customers consequent
upon this division of trade. But quere
whether that alone is sufficient upon
which to ground an injunction to discontinue the use of the labels or wrappers
supplied by the manufacturers of their
own accord and spontaneity? What
bad the defendants to do -ith the
breach of contract on the part of the
manufacturers as against the plaintiffs ?
The plaintiffs had their remedy for such
breach. The public was not damnified,
but the rather benefited by the competition. The object of the plaintiffs had
been to establish a monopoly by entering into an agreement with the manufacturers in London to supply them up
the 1st April 1881 with all the soap
which should be sold in the United
States; and when it should be supplied
for sale the wrapper containing it was
to be countersigned with the name of
Howard, Sanger & Co. As Howard,
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Sauger & Co. were not the manufacturers, if such counter-signature meant
anything it meant that they were the
sole agents in the United States for
such manufacturers, but surely the
defendants were not responsible for
the breach of faith on the part of the
manufacturers. If, however, such was
not the interpretation to be put upon
the counter-signature, then the plaintiffs
were guilty of a pious fraud upon the
public by leaving such a question open
to a doubtful inference, when the words
"sole agents" would have removed all
ambiguity. The lack of such explanatory words would seem to identify them
with the manufacture itself, and the defendants can scarcely be blamed for
accepting the same label gratuitously
and spontaneously furnished them by
the manufacturers themselves. It would
almost seem as if the plaintiffs had overreached themselves in their eagerness
to monopolize the trade in this article,
and that their real remedy was for
breach of contract against the manufacturers rather than by injunction to
restrain the use of that which had not
damnified the public or the manufacturer, however it might have affected
the profits of the plaintiffs in dividing
with them the credit of a position of
ambiguous inference, in the one case the
subject of special agreement, and in the
other of ordinary mercantile arrangement between manufacturers and their
agents, leaving the former to label their
packets as they thought fit.
In the Superior Court of Cincinnati
(Singer M3anqf. Co. v. Brill, not yet reported), the court, FoisaRe, J., after
referring to the opinion of the lord
chancellor expressed in the House of
Lords in the case of Singer v. Wilson,
supra, enjoined defendant from using
the name : Singer," either alone or in
combination with other words, in advertisements of his machine, and from selling sewing-machines having the external
appearance, shape or ornamentation of
VoL. X=C.-83

the machines of plaintiffs' manufacture.
The court, in the course of its opinion,
propounded the following query : " Can
there be infringement of a trade name
by merely advertising an article by the
name * * * without selling or offering it with the name attached ?
"However it may be in the case of a
trademark, as distinguished from a trade
name, I am satisfied both 'upon reason
and authority that there may be infringement in that way of a trade name.
' I don't know how I can better show
this authority and the reason of it than
by quoting from the opinion of the lord
chancellor in the case of Singer v. Wilson, L. R., 3 App. Cases 389, where
he says, speaking upon this point:
'My lords, I am unable to see that
this makes any difference in point of
principle.
It may well be that if an
imitated trademark is attached to the
article manufactured, there will, from
that circumstance, be the certainty that
it will pass into every hand into which
the article passes, and be thus a continuing and ever present representation
with regard to it; but a representation
made by advertisements that the articles
sold at a particular shop are articles
manufactured by A. B. (if that is the
legitimate effect of the advertisements,
which is a separate question) must, in
my opinion, be as imperious in principle,
and may possibly be quite as injurious in
operation, as th same representation
made upon the articles themselves.'
"The next question here presented is
that suggested by the parenthetical sentence of the lord chancellor, as above
quoted, viz. : What is the effect of the
advertisements made by the defendant ?"
POnAXER, J., then proceeds to deal
with the defendant's advertisements and
arrives at the conclusion that the plaintiff's right of property in the word" Singer," as a trade name, had been infringed by the defendant.
In JMorgan, Sons 6- Co. v. Troxell et
al., Sup. Ct. of N. Y., Gen. Term, be-
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fore

their goods as being the gbods of the
plaintiffs. They simply represented them
says, expressing the opinion of the court,
as what they were, viz., the goods or
"A trademark is not necessarily limited articles manufactured by Low, Son &
to a device or name.
The true rule is Hayden, of London, England, and, it
well stated in the late English case of
might be added, the same as sold in the
Mitchell v. Henry, 43 L. T. R. (N. S.)
United States by the plaintiffs, as veri186. In that case Lord Justice JA31ES
fiedby the counter signature of their
observed, ' the Master of the Rolls seems
name of "Howard, Sanger & Co." imto me to have considered that when he
pressed on a wrapper supplied by ie
had satisfied himself, on the examination manufacturers themselves to the defendof the things before him, that the twisted
ants, who were at the trial wholly ignorthread in the defendant's selvage was ant of any contract of an exclusire charin a position different from that of the acter between the manufacturers and the.
plaintiff's, and that the plaintiff's sel- plaintiffs, and held no other relation to the
vage could not be said to be white, then
transaction than that of purchasers from
that determined the question.
I am
the same manufacturers of the same artibound to say that to me the question is cle as that which the plaintiffs themselves
not whether the selvage is white, but whe- had purchased from the same source,
ther it was what the trads knew as white with the same label affixed by the manselvage; whether anybody connected with ufacturers in both instances, without any
collusion on the part of the defendants.
the trade could have any doubt whatever
As was observed by the court, " The
as to what was meant by white selvage.
Then it is not at all conclusive to my. facts that have been found will probably
mind whether the position of the de- require no further trial of this action for
the purpose of determining the rights of
fendants is the same or different from
the parties."
And as the injunction
the position of the plaintiffs. It resolves
itself into the old question, which has simply prohibits the sale of the soap by
always been the question to be deter- the defendants with the name of Howard,
Sanger & Co. upon the packages, the
mined in these cases-are the defendants,
not in words, but by acts and by soniccase is scarcely likely to be carried furthing on the face of the articles, repre- ther, the object of the public being to obsenting their goods as being the goods tain the-genuine article from the manudf the plaintiffs?
That is to say, are facturers Low, Son & Hayden, leaving
they using something which is calculated
them to settle their difference with Howto pass off their goods a the goods of
ard, Sanger & Co., on the question of
the plaintiffs ?'
breach of contract. As that contract
"It
all comes to this," continues
expired on 1st April 1881, the trade in
Judge BARRETT, " as was said in Perry the soap in question may henceforth prov. Truefitt, 6 Bear. 66, ' a man is not bably be considered as open to all who
to sell his goods under the pretence that desire to engage in it as agents in the
they are the goods of another.' The law United States for the manufacturers of
does not limit the form of the pretence ; that article, each agent appending, if he
that depends upon the facts of each sees fit, his own name or counter-signaparticular case."
We are, we con- thre to the packages received from fhe
fess, unable to discover in what respect manufacturers.
To this arrangement
the defendants in the prncipal case pre- the consent of the manufacturers may be
tended that the goods they sold were deemed a foregone conclusion, even if
the goods of another other than the such consent were indispensable.
manufacturer or that by anything on
HuGn WEIGtgA..
New York.
the face of the articles, they represented
DAVIs,

RETT, JJ.,

C. J., BYRADY
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Court of Chaneery of New Jersey.
MARY ANN HESKETH v. JOIN MURPHY, EXECUTOR.
A trust "to employ the annual income of the said moneys so invested, and from
time to time to be invested, for the relief of the most deserving poor of the city
of Paterson aforesaid forever, without regard to color or sex ; but no person who
is known to be intemperate, lazy, immoral or undeserving, to receive any benefit
from the said fund," withl a power of appoinfing and substituting trustees for those
named, is a valid charity, and will be executed.

BILL to set aside trust for charity.
reported in the opinion.
.D.

The facts are sufficiently

. Bolton and W. B. Gourley, for complainant.

If. A. Williams' for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RUNYON, Chancellor.-William S. Malcolm, late of Paterson,
died in 1872. His will contained the following provision:
"After the death of my said wife, I hereby empower and direct
my said trustees or trustee for the time being of this my will, to
employ the annual income of the said moneys so invested, and
from time to time to be invested, for the relief of the most deserving poor of the city of Paterson aforesaid forever, without regard
to color or sex; but no person who is known to be intemperate,
lazy, immoral or undeserving, to receive any benefit from the said
fund. And for the purpose of preserving and continuing a perpetual succession of trustees for the purpose of carrying into full
effect the provisions of this my will, I do hereby empower my said
trustees or trustee for the time being, if any, whether retiring from
the office of trustee or not, or if none, then I direct and hereby
empower the proving executors or executor foir the time being, or
the administrators or administrator for the time being, of the last
surviving trustee, to substitute by any proper writing under his,
her or their hands or hand, any fit person or persons in whom
alone, or, as the case may be, jointly, with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, my trust estate shall vest or proper
assurance be vested."
The objection made to the gift is that it is too indefinite,
especially seeing that, as it is contended, no power of selection of
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the objects is conferred. The gift is for the relief of the most deserving poor of the city of Paterson, without regard to color or
sex, to whom alone it is to be confined. A gift for the relief of
the poor of a city generally, is undoubtedly a valid charity: Shelf.
on Mortmain 62. And so, too, where the gift is confined to a
certain class of poor persons, as to poor, pious persons: .Nfash v.
.Morley, 5 Beav. 177; or, to the widows and orphans (construed
to mean poor widows and orphans) of a parish: Atty.-Gcn. v.
Comber, 2 Sim. & Stu. 93; and the deservinig poor of a town:
Goodell v. Association, 2 Stew. Eq. 32. "Where," says Lord
HARDWICKE, in Atey -Gen. v. Pearce, 2 Atk. 87, "testators have
not any particular person in their contemplation, but leave it to
the discretion of a trustee to choose out the objects, though such
person is private, and each particular object. may be said to be
private, yet in the extensiveness of the benefit accruing from them
they may very properly be called public charities. A sum to be
disposed of by A. B. and his executors, at their discretion, among
poor housekeepers, is of. this kind." The general principle is that
courts of chancery uphold and administer gifts where they are
made to particular purposes which are charitable within the letter
and spirit of the. statute (43 Eliz. c. 4), or where they are made
to charity generally, if there is a. trustee with power to make them
definite: De Camp v. Dobbins, 2 Stew. Eq. 36. In the case in
hand the testator describes a class of persons fbr whose relief the
trust is designed, and the duty of selection necessarily and
obviously falls on the trustee. By the terms of the gift he is to
employ the income for the purpose mentioned. For want of a
trustee this court would appoint one to execute the trust. In Barclay v. Maskelyne, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1294, where the gift was for the
benefit of such poor persons emigrating as the trustees should consider most deserving, and the trustees declined to act, the court
directed a scheme f~or the execution of the trust. The gift in
question is a valid charity.
The following cases show instances
of similar bequests to tle poor which
have been upheld as charities; to poor
men decayed bymisfortune or the visitation of God: Skinner's Case, Moore 129 ;
for the marriage of poor virgins: Porter's Case, I Co. 26 ; for poor dissenting
ministers living in any county: Waller

v. Childs, Amb. 524; to place out
apprentices and to be lent to decayed
tradesmen: Attorney-Generalv. Coventry,
2 Vern. 397, Colle's P. C. 280 ; to
the poor inhabitants of S. : AttorneyGeneral v. Clarke, Amb. 422 ; to the
poor: Attorney-General v. Ranee, Arab.
422 u.; Attorney-General v. Peacock,
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Finch 245 ; for the poor inhabitants of
S., in the county of H., and of B., in the
county, of H.: Hereford v. Adams, 7
Yes. 324 ; for the relief of the poor of
S. : Attorney-General v. Wilkinson, 1
Bea. 372 ; to ehurclxwardens to distribute amongst twelve poor people who
had lived in the parish for twelve years,
"in honest fame and opinion:" AttorneyGeneral v. Bovill, 1 Phill. 762 ; for the
aid and relief of the poor citizens and
inhabitants of E., " who are heavily
burfhened with the fee farm rents of that
city, and other impositions and talliages :" Attorney-General v. Exeter, 2
Russ. 45, 3 Russ. 395; to the poor
inhabitants of T. R. : Rogers v. Thomas,
2 Keen 8; to the widows and orphans
of L.: Attorney-General v. G'mer, 2
Sim. & Stu. 93 ; to the widows and
children of seamen belonging to the
town of L. : Powell v. Attorney-General,
3 Moriv. 48; to such poor widows
or creditable, industrious unmarried
women, upwards of forty years of age,
residing in U. and C., having no relief
from those places: Russell v. Keltett, 3
Sm. & Gift. 264; to the overseers of
the poor of S., to be applied to their use
and benefit, in aid of the poor rate:
Preece v. Howells, 2 B. & Ad. 744; for
the relief of the widows and orphans
of the clergy of W. : Kilvert's Trusts,
L'. R., 12 Eq. 183, 7 Oh. App. 170;
for the education of poor children at a
school about to be erected near C. :
Society v. Price, 7 Irish Eq. 260; to
the monks of S., to provide clothing for
the poor children attending their schools :
Carbery v. Cox, 3 Irish Ch. 231 ; for
building a house for reduced gentlewomen: Attorney-Generalv. Power, I Ball
& B. 145; Attorney-Generalv. Tancred, I
Eden 10 ; for clothing such poor children
as should .be educated in the school of
the nunneryof W., Id. ; to the poor "on
my little estate in S. :" Bristow v. Bristow, 5 Beav. 289 ; among poor pious
persons, male or female, old or infirm,
as the executors see fit, not omitting

large and sick families, if of good character : Nash v. Iorley, 5 Bear. 177 ; to
be disposed of by A. B. and his executors at their discretion, among poor housekeepers: Attorney- General v. Pearce, 2
Atk. 87 ; to faithful domestic servants
settled in G. : M.1iller Y. Rowan, 5 Cl. &
Fin. 99. See Reeve v. Attorney-General,
3 Hare 191 ; Loscombe v. Wintringham,
13 Bear. 87 ; to widows or orphans of
non-conformist ministers, not being at
the time worth upwards of 100!. a year,
and widows being upwards of fifty years
of age: Attorney-General v. Gleg, 1
Atk. 356 ; to be yearly disposed of for
ever in relieving the distressed and poor
about G., in meat, drink and clothing,
at the discretion of the executor, forever:
Attorney-General v. Johnson, Amb. 190,
note; "some donation out of my property to the poor of the different places
where I have estates :" Paice v. Canterbury, 14 Yes. 363; in relieving such
distressed persons, either the widows or
children of poor clergymen or otherwise,
"as my said wife shall judge most
worthy and deserving objects :" Waldo
v. Coley, 16 Yes. 206; see Norris v.
Thomson, 4 C. E. Gr. 308, 5 Id.
489 ; an annuity to three parishes of L.,
for the poor of the parishes, and the
residue for the use of the poor in general forever: Attorney-General v. Jratthews, 2 Ley. 167. To trustees, in
such way as they might judge best calculated to promote the knowledge of the
Catholic Christiai religion among the
poor and ignorant inhabitants of S. and
W. : West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. & K.
684. See Alt.- Generalv. 31archant, L.
R., 3 Eq. 424; to the vicar ann ca-urhwardens of the parish of 0., for the
benefit of the poor of the parish of 0.
and adjoining parishes: Attorney- General
v. Brandreth, I You. & Coll. Ch. 200.
See Edinburgh v. Aubrey, Amb. 236;
to pay and divide the residue at Christmas every year for ever, amongst the
aged poor of the parish :Fiskv.AttorneyGeneral, L. I"., 4 Eq. 521 ; for the
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employment and support of the poor
of the parish of R.: Atto.-ney-General v.
Blizard, 21 Bear. 233; to commissioners of emigration, for the benefit of poor
persons emigrating to certain designated
colonies: Barclay v.
a1lfakelyne, 4 Jur.
(N. S.) 1294 ; to forty decayed families
that are come to poverty purely by losses
unavoidable; to forty poor widows upwards of fifty years of age, and not
worth 401.; to forty poor maidens whose
parents formerly lived well, and are
come to decay; to twenty poor boys to
clothe and put out to apprentice : Attorney-General Y. Speed, West's Ch. 491 ;
to be divided equally, twice in the year,
between twenty aged widows and spinsters of the parish of P. : Thompson v.
Corbq, 27 Bear. 649 ; to purchase land,
to be let out to the poor at a low rent :
Crafton Y. Frith, 15 Jur. 737. See
Attorney-General v. Leigh, 2 Yes. 389;
Attorney-General v. Whichurch, 3 Id.
141 ; Attorney-Generalr. Drapers' Co.,
2 Beav. 508; Reeve v. Attorney-General,
3 Hare 191 ; for the rclief of the poor
in W. : Wilkinson v. Mali,, 2 Cr. & Jar.
636; to be distributed every Sunday,
after morning service, by the minister
and churchwardens of D. among so
many poor of the parish as were most
constant in attending divine service:
Ashton's Charity, 27 Bear. 115 ; for the
most poor and needy that be of good
life and conversation that should he
inhabiting the parish of K. : Campden
Charities, L. R., 18 Ch. Div. 310 ; for
providing a proper school-house for the
instructing of twenty poor girls of the
parish of B. in needle-work, reading
and writing, and also for Iothing them :
Johnston v. Swann, 3 Mfadd. 457 ; also,
Attorney- General v. Pilliams, 2 Cox 0.
C. 387 ; Attorney-General v. Lepine, 2
Swanst. 181 ; to the incumbent of U.,
for providing wine and bread for the
sick poor of U. : Birkett'e Case, L. B.
9 Ch. Div. 576.
See S'raus v. Goldstaid, 8 Sim. 614 ; Attorney-General r.
Haberdashers' Co., 1 Myl. & K. 420;

in supporting or founding free or ragged
schools for gutter children, or for the
poorest of the poor: Morley v. Croxon,
IL. R., 8 Ch. Div. 156. See School
Board v. Falconer, Id. 571 ; to the
incumbents of C. and S., to be divided
equally amongst three poor sick infirm
people residing in their respective parishes: Williams's Case, L. R., 5 Ch.
Div. 735 ; the surplus to be given by
testator's executors every year to poor
pious members of the Methodist society
of G. above the age of fifty years:
Dawson v. Small, L. R., 18 Eq. 114;
501. for the poor of T. : Kane Y. Cosgrave, 10 Irish Eq.-R. 211 ; for an
almshouse for aged men and women;
for schools for poor boys and poor girls,
and that even- poor boy and girl, when
leaving the school, have a "whole duty
of man," or some other of the books
of devotion named; to redeem poor
persons out of prison : Attorney-General
Y. Bishop of Limerick, 5 Irish It. Eq.
403. See Thrnpp v. Collett. 26 Beav.
125 ; Attorney-General v. Painter Co.,
2 Cox C. 0. 51; to sbt the poor on
work, and otherwise for the relief of the
poor, in such parishes and such manner
as the trustees named or their survivor
should think fit, so as the parish of S.,
in the city of R., should be one of them:
Attorney-General Y. Buller, Jac. 407;
to trustees to par the interest and dividends to the poor inhabitants of the
parish of L., in the county of AL, for
ever, 'by half-yearly payments : AttorneyGeneral v. Freeman, Dan. 117, 5 Price
425. See Attorney General v. Ward, 3
Ves. 328; to V., his executors, &c.,
desiring him to dispose of the same in
such charities as he thought fit, recommending poor clergymen with large
families and good characters: .loggridge
v. Thacwell, 1 Id. 464, 7 Id. 36 ;
bread to be distributed to poor persons
attending divine service, and chanting
testator's version of the Psalms [which
could not be chanted, because not authorized], Brantham r. East Burgold,
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2 Yes. 388; to give a quartern loaf
of bread to twenty persons weekly :
Limbrey v. Gurr, 6 I'add. 151 ; a
moiety to be laid out in buying corn
and firing, to be given to the poor of
W. about Christmas or N ew Years
day : Attorney-General v. Wisbec, 6
Jur. 655; to buy and distvibute one
hundred and thirty-eight quarters of
coals, or-money to buy coals at 8d. per
quarter, amongst fie poor:' Yordon's
Charity, 5 Sine. 571; for clothing and
educating eight poor boys in E. : Latymer's Charity, L. R., 7 Eq. 353 ; for
the garments of twelve poor men and
twelve poor women, at a specified price;
M1erchant Tailors' Co.v.Attorney- General,
L. R., I I Eq. 35.
See Attorney-General v. Wax Chandlers' Co., L. H., 5
Ch. App. 503; to keep a house in
readiness for the reception of poor
plague patients during their sickness,
and for a burial-place for such as are
deceased: Attorney- General v. Earl of
Craven, 21 Beav. 392 ; to poor relations,
or, in default of them, to poor persons
in the county of A.: Campbell v. Earl
of Radnor, 1 Bro. C. C. 271 ; to necessitated decayed freemen of a designated
company, their widows and children,
not exceeding 101. a year to any family:
Ironmongers' Co. v. Attorney- General,
10 Cl. & Fin. 908; to and for the support, maintenance and education of the
poor white citizens of Kent county generally: State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch.
392, 421 ; for the education of poor
children belonging to the county: Arewson v. Starke, 46 Ga. 88 Loverraling
Beall v. Drane, 25 Id. 430] ; to the
poor of Madison county: Heuser v.
Han-is, 42 Ill. 425; -Prickettv. People,
88 Id. 115 ; to the education of colored
children in the state of Indiana: Lindley's Case, 32 Ind. 367 [see Grimes v.
Harmon, 35 Id. 198] ; to the county of
0., in the state of Indiana, for colored
children of said county: Craig v.
Secrist, 54 Ind. 419 ; for the sole relief
and benefit of poor widows over the

age of fifty years, of irreproachable
character, who have resided not under
three years within eight miles of the
town of W., and who have no certain
income: De Bruler v. Ferguson, 54 Ind.
549 ; to the commissioners of L. county,
for the use and benefit of the orphan
poor, and for other destitute persons,
of said county: Commissioners v. Rogers, 55 Ind. 297 ; for educating some
poor orphans of this county, to be selected by the county court, * * *
and to be confined to such as are not able
to educate themselves: Mloore v. Moore,
4 Dana 354; to the suffering poor of
the town of A.: Howard v. Am. Peace
Soc., 49 Me. 288; for the comfort, relief and welfare of the poor and distressed within the neighborhood of P. :
Deering v. Adams, 37 Me. 264; to
deserving relations and such indigent
persons as they (the executors) may
think worthy of the same, and in
such manner as they may think proper: Dreto v. Wakefield, 54 Me. 291 ;
to the first committee. of the school
society in the town of R., for the use
and benefit of such families in said society in their schooling as shall not
exceed, in the list of the town for the
year, the sum of $50: Birkard v. Scott,
39 Conn. 63; to purchase fuel, to be
given or sold at low prices, as may be
deemed best by the trustees, to such
worthy and industrious persons as are
not supported in whole or in part at the
public expense: lerebb v. Neal, 5 Allen
575 ; to provide and sustain a home for
respectable, destitute, aged, native-born
American men and women: Odell v.
Odell, 10 Allen 1 ; to provide groceries
for the sick and infirm, and clothing and
fuel for the helpless and needy : Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. 280 ; to be applied to the use of the poor of Old
South Church: Attorney-General v. Old
South Society, 13 Allen 474 ; to pay
over to such of the aged and infirm
native-born inhabitants of K., and
maiden ladies who are native-born in-
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habitants of K., although they be not
aged, as shall he deemed, by the person
appointed for that purpcse by the town
of K., most needy, and no part shall be
paid to any person who is receiving support as a pauper: Fellows v. Miner, 119
Mass. 541 ; to ttke, receive and dis.
tribute the same among :he poor, meritorious 'widows living and belonging
within the limits of the 'First Ecclesiastical Society of the town of N. : Soler
v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221 ; to furnish
relief to all poor emigrants and travellers coming to S. on their way bona fide
to settle in the West: Chambers v. St.
Louis, 29 Mo. 543; to be divided between two townships, according to their
population, for the purpose of educating
their poor orphan children, and any surplus to the poor widows: 3lason v.
Trustees, 1M0. E. Gr. 47 ; to testator's
brother, to be applied a; discretion to
alleviating the wants and sufferings of
the deserving poor of X[, : Goodell v.
Union Assem., 2 Stew. Eq. 32 ; for the
relief of such indigent persons residing
in the town of F. as the trustees for the
time being shall select: Skotwell v. 31oft,
2 Sandf. Ch. 46 [see Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 609] ; to executors, to
apply at their discretion $50 a year to
the relief of the poor of S. church, for a
specified number of years: JfcLoughlin
v. McLoughlin, 30 Barb. 458; for the
education of the children of the poor,
who shall be educated in the academy in
the village of H.- lillianisv. Williams,
8 N. Y. 525 [see Bascon v. Albertson,
34 N. Y. 617] ; for the establishment
of a free school or school. for the benefit
of the poor of D. county : State v. 3icGowen, 2 Ired. Eq. 9. See Black v.
Ligon, Harp. Eq. 205; after the death
of B. to the poor of the county of B. :
State v. Gerard, 2 Ired. Eq. 210; to
the bishop of North Carolina, in trust for
the poor orphans of the state, and the
said bishop and his successors to have
the right to select such orphans : .Miller
v. Atkinson, 63 N. 0. 537. See Jack v.

RLilly, 2 Hud. & Bro. 301 ; Mullanphy
v. Peterson, I Mo. 758 ; a school for

orphan children or the children of poor
and indigent parents, " who, in the
judgment of my trustees, are best entitled to the donation, and it is my wish
to clothe and maintain the indigent
scholars as well as school them:"
Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks 96; to
establish a school in the town of Z. for
the poor children of said town : Zanesville
Manuf. Co. v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio 203;
20 Id. 483; 17 Ohio St. 352 ; to such
of the poor and needy and fatherless of
J. and M. townships as are not able to
support themselves : Urney v. Il'ooden,
1 Ohio St, 160 ; to a church, to be laid
out in bread annually for ten years, for
the poor of the congregation : Witman
v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88; to a city to
erect a hospital for tie relief of the indigent blind and lame: Philadelphia v.
Elliott, 3 Itawle 170; to alleviate the'
suffering of the most prudent poor, but
not the intemperate, in procuring food,
clothing and other necessaries which
such persons want in winter: Grandom's Estate, 6 W. & S. 537 ; for the
distribution of good books among poor
people in the back part of Pennsylvania:
Pickcering v. Shotwell, 10 Penn. St. 23.
See Attorney-General v. Stepney, 10
Ves. 22 ; Browne v. Yeall, 9 Id. 406 ;
to found a college for white male
orphans, preference being given to
orphans born in the city of P. : Soohan
v. Philadephia,33 Penn. St: 9 ; Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Id. 9; Vidal v.
Girard,2 How. 128 : 7 Wall. 14 ; to
the poor of several specified churches,
during the winter, at the discretion of
the pastor or trustees: Yard's Appeal,
64 Penn. St. 95; to apply the interest
for ten years to the support of the poor
of N. township, then to keep the principal for the use of the county forever:
Lawrence v. Leonard, 83 Penn. St. 206;
among poor white housekeepers and
roomkeepers of good character residing
in P. ; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Penn.

HESKETH v. MURPHY.
St. 169 ; to apply to the relief of the
destitute in such manner as chaxity is
usually distributed by the minister at
large in the city of B. : Derby v. Derby,
4 R. . 414; to the M. church * * *
for the purchase of Bibles and religious
tracts, and the distribution of the same
among the destitute: Attorney-General
v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99 ; 2 Strobh.
Eq. 379 ; to found a school for testator's children and their descendants,
and those of his brothers and sisters,
and such of the poor children of the
county as the trustees might select:
Franldin v. Arnifield, 2 Sneed 305;
also Pa.nchal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173;
Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; to the
city of C., for the use and benefit of the
poor of said city: Hornberger v. Hornberger, 12 Heisk. 635 ; to the ministry
and vestry of the parish of L., for the
use of the poorest inhabitants of the said
parish, being honest people: Richmond
Co. v. Tayloe, Grim. (Va.) 336 ; to be
expended in the education of the scholars
of poor people in the. county of 0. :
Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716; for the
education and tuition of worthy indigent
females: Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis.
70; to erect an orphan asylum in or
near R., * * * to be open for the reception of all orphan children in said
county, and such other poor, neglected
and destitute children as the managers
* * * may agree to receive: Gould v.
Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106.
See Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; to
the cities of N. and B., one-half to each,
for the education of the poor in those
cities: McDonogh v. Murdoch, 15 How.
367 ; $1000 to be paid by my executor
for the education of the freedmen of this
nation, his best judgment and discretion
to be exercised in said appropriation :
McAllister v. McAllister, 46 'Vt. 272.
See Meeting Street Society v. Hail, 8
R. I. 234 ; to V. and C., to be received
and loaned out by three commissioners
of V. and C., and applied by them to
the education and tuition of all the panVOL. X=X-84

per and poor children of V. and C.,
whose parents are not able to support
them: Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala.
299 ; for an asylum for destitute orphan
boys and girls at M.: Milne v. Milne,
17 La. 46 ; for the benefit of the poor :
Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff. 469; for the
support of poor and old women: Gooch
v. Associdtion, 109 Mass. 558 ; for the
relief of the Jewish poor: Mayer v.
Society, 2 Brews. 385 ; also Lsaac v.
Gompertz, Amb. 228, note; De Costa
v. De Pas, 2' Swast. 490, note; for the
benefit of needy single women and
widows; for the education and instruction of poor and needy children in B.,
to furnish them with necessary clothing
while attending school : Swasey v. Amer.
Bible Soc., 57 Mle. 523 ; for the education of pious, indigent youths: McCord
v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15 ; to the five
monthly meetings of women Friends
held in P., towards the relief of the
poor members belonging thereto: Magill
v. Brown, Brightly (Pa.) 346; a devise
of lands for a site for the erection of a
hospital for foundlings : Ould v. Washington Hospital, 1 McArth. 541 ; 95 U.
S. 303; in trust for the county of A.,
for establishing and supporting a manual labor school for poor white children
of the county: Kinnaird v. Miller, 25
Gratt. 107 ; to a lodge of freemasons,
for the good of the craft, or for the relief of indigent and distressed worthy
masons, their widows and orphans:
Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 538. See
Indianapotis v. Grand Lodge, 25 Ind.
518; Rabb v. Reed, 5 Rawle 151;
Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 535 ; Thomas
v. Elbnaker, 1 Clark (Pa.) 502 ; Swjft
v. Beneficial Soc., 73 Penn. St. 362;
Blenon's Estate, Brightly (Pa.) 338;
Ererett v. Carr, 59 Me. 325 ; King v.
Parker, 9 Cash. 71 ; Pander Volgen v.
Yates, 3 Barb. Ch. 242.
Some cases, however, hold similar
bequests invalid, on the ground of uncertainty : Kendall v. Granger,5 Beav.
300; Attorney- General v. FZshmonger's
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Ca., 2 Id. 151 ; Ewen v. Bannernan, 2
Dow. & C1. 74; Lyons v. East India
Co., 1 Moo. I. C. 175; Thomipson v.
Thompson, 1 Coll. 39A ; Heath v. Chapnan, 2 Drew. 417 : Lir'brey v. Gun, 6
.Madd. 151 ; Flint v. 1V7arren, 1l Jur.
665; Beall v. Drane, 25 Ga. 430 ;
L epage v. McNantara, 5 Iowa 124;
Trippe v. Frazier, 4 Harr. & J. 446;
Dashidl v. Attorney-General, 5 Id.
392 ; 6 Id. 1 ; Wildermc'n v. Balthmore,
8 Md. 551.; Needles v. Martin, 33 Id.
609 ; Goodrich's Case, 2 Redf. 45;
Gallego v. Attorney-General, 3 Leigh

450; Reiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276;
Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298;
Owens v. 3Iissionar Society, 14 Id.
380; State v. Prewett, 20 Mo. 165;
White v. Fsk, 22 Conn. 31 ; Literary
Fund v. Dawson, 10 Leigh 147 ; Ayres
v. 2I.ethodist Church, 3 Sandf. 351;
Barnes v. Barnes, 3 Crunch C. C. 269;
Morse v. Carpenter, 19 Vt. 613; Taylor
v. Keep, 2 Bradw. 368; Janey v.
See further,
Latane, 4 Leigh 327.
Wintringham, 13 Beav.
Loscombe v.
lchols v. Allen, 130 Mass.
89, note;
JoHN H. ST.uWAT.
211.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JONES v. JONES.
"Where a grantor is shown to Jbe insane on a particular subject, or with reference
to a particular person, and the deed is an act referable to that state of mind, no
more need be proved in order to vacate the deed. In such a case the rule of equity
that a grantor must be proved to have been of unsound mind or under undue influence at the very time the deed impeaclled was executed, is not applicable.
It is sufficient to invalidate any instrument executed for an inadequate consideration by a person of weak intellect, to show that the person in whose favor it was
executed held a situation of confidence with respect to the maker of such instrument.
Where a grantee sustaining intimate confidential relations to the grantor, claims
that the consideration of 3 deed to her consists in part of indebtedness of the grantor to her on account of bans of money made by her to the grantor, the burden of
proof is upon such grantee to prove herself possessed of funds with which to make
such loan.
APPEAL of Fannie Lee Townsend Jones from a decree of the
Common Pleas No. 4, of Philadelphia county.
Bill in equity by John Sidney Jones, a lunatic, by his committee, Michael Arnold, complainant, against Fannie Lee Townsend
Jones, defendant, praying for a reconveyanoe of a certain tract of
land in the city of Philadelphia, from defendant to complainant.
An answer was filed, and the case referred to an examiner and
afterwards to a master, by whom the facts were found to be as
follows :
The complainant, John Sidney Jones, was a carpet dealer, in
prosperous circumstances. Sometime prior to 1852 he became acquainted with Fannie Lee Townsend (the respondent) at a labor
reform congress, and brought her to Philadelphia, fitting up a room
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over his store for her, where she lived, and employing her at a salary of $6 per week to edit a radical paper called the "Jubilee."
The testimony clearly showed that she at once gained an enormous
influence over him, so much so that he spoke of her as being endowed
with superhuman and even divine qualities. The effect upon his
business was immediately felt, and ended in business difficulties.
His wife was shown to have begged him to discontinue his relations
with respondent, and failing to so induce him, to have finally, in
1852, died (in the opinion of the witnesses) of a broken heart.
After the death of his wife, Jones cohabited with the respondent
as his wife.
Jones seems to have been at all times a man of marked peculiarities. He gave expression to opinions that property in land should
be limited to the right of temporary occupancy; that men should
live in boats upon the water, and that he with the respondent would
start a bank called the "Argonautic Bank," to furnish the capital
for the purpose. During his connection with the respondent he
spoke of her as one who could do no wrong, and yielded to her
every expressed wish.
In 1856 proceedings de lunatico were begun against Jones, but
were not carried to completion. In 1873 proceedings were again
instituted, and on March 20th 1873, he was found to be a lunatic,
and incapable of managing his estate, and further that he had been
so, with lucid intervals, for twenty years.
In 1861, while respondent was living with him as his wife, Jones,
for a consideration of $200, conveyed the premises in question to
the respondent, "under and subject nevertheless to such judgments
and mortgages as may be upon the premises." At the time of the
conveyance the premises were worth about $5000; the encumbrances were partially discharged by the committee.
In 1867 the house on the land was destroyed by fire, the title
and the policy of insurance both being at that time in the name of
the respondent. The amount of the insurance was $4000, and
was claimed by respondent on the ground that Jones was her debtor,
and that the property had been conveyed to her as security for the
debt. The matter was finally compromised by each party taking
one-half of the money, respondent then agreeing to reconvey the
property to a nominee of Jones; this she subsequently declined
to do.
Before the examiner, the respondent testified (under objection as
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to competency) that she bad some money in savings banks and
saved some from time to time in doctoring, writing and speculating. Her son by a former marriage also testified that his mother
had money in her possession before her marriage -with Jones.
On the other hand it was shown that Jones had, in the presence
of different persons, asserted that she was a "beggar" when she
came to him, and that. she had robbed him of his property.
The witnesses present at the execution of the deed in question
and the counsel under whose instructions it was drawn testified that
Jones was of sound mind, and thoroughly understood the nature of
the transaction, but the testimony of the witnesses on the part of
the complainant was to the contrary.
The master reported a decree in favor of the complainant. Exceptions were filed which, after argument, were overruled by the
court below, which entered a decree in accordance with the prayer
of the bill. The respondent thereupon took this appeal assigning
for error the decree of the court.
G. Morgan BEldridge, Francis -E. Brewster and F. Carroll
Brewster, for appellant.
W. T. Ker and .fichard Faux, for appellee
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARswooD, 0.

.- It is not a rigid rule in equity, that a gran-

tor must be proved to have been of unsound mind or under undue
influence at the very time the deed impeached was executed. If it
be shown that he was insane on a,particular subject, or with reference to a particular person, and the deed is an act referable to that
state of the mind, no more is needed. A man may be of perfectly
sound mind on all subjects but one, a shrewd man of business, able
to make contracts, no one in ordinary intercourse seeing or suspecting that anything was wrong, but touch him on a particular subject
and it is at once recognised that he is a madman. The section of
Dr. Ray's treatise on .the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity on
Partial Intellectual Mania, p. 155, is a very curious and instructive
one. John Sidney Jones was a madman of this character. The
evidence clearly shows that during a considerable period of his
life, comprising the time of the execution of the deed in question,
and many years before and after, he was decidedly the subject
of an insane hallucination in regard to the appellant. He regarded
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her as a most extraordinary woman, even believing her to be a
divine person. She could say or do or wish nothing which was
wrong. The evidence makes this out clearly. The consequence
was, that her influence over him was unbounded. She 'seems to
have got from him whatever bonds or notes she wanted. She testifies that it was for money loaned by her to him. Where did she get
this money ? She says, "I had about $6000 of my own money at the
time I was married; I let the General have as much of it as $4000
I could not say exactly $4000, between $4000 and 5000. The
money that I let the General have was my own money, independent
of him." Where did it come from? It could be very clearly
shown, or at least explained. Her son says, "I am aware that
previous to my mother's marriage to General Jones she had some
means, from the fact that she sent me from the East a large remittance, which I retained until she desired it, and then paid it to her.
I heard in the family that she inherited property from her father
and mother's estate." If she had this large amount of money
when she first became connected with General Jones, where was it?
In bank, in a strong box, in bonds, mortgages, stocks or loans ?
We are not informed. The facts of the case, as testified by herself, seem inconsistent with it: " When I was married to General
Jones he fed me, but I bought my own clothes. I occasionally
earned some money in various ways, doctoring, writing, speculating,
buying and selling merchandise, jewels and ornamental things.
One time I speculated in a piano. She had for editing the paper
called the "1Jubilee" $6 a week, and a room to occupy as an office
and a room to sleep in. She adds, "I had my money in the
National Trust Company at the corner of Walnut and Third streets;
I said what I had in the city of Philadelphia I had in that bank.
I had some money in a savings bank in Providence. I had about
$600 there. I removed it from that bank, I think, about 1858,
but can't recollect the year. I kept it by me for a good while. I
think I put part of it in the Old Savings Bank in Walnut street
above Third street." Her account with the National Trust Company is in evidence, beginning October 1852, a considerable
number of small deposits only, only one over $100, and her balance at the end of the year was $474. The next year showed a balance of $576, which remained to her credit. The balance, $851.75,
she withdrew April 4th 1855. She began again January 1856,
with a deposit of $1200, which, with several small deposits, she
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had withdrawn by November of the same year. It is unnecessary
to follow these accounts further. It is hardly necessary to say that
they fail to make out a case. The able and elaborate argument
of the learned counsel for the appellant failed to convince us that
there was any consideration for the deed in question. As the
learned president in the court below remarked, in his opinion, "it
may be doubted whether, during the time of these transactions,
she ever had any property at all, except what she received from John
Sidney Jones." Under the circumstances of this case, his mental
hallucination in regard to her, the onus was upon her to make out
this clearly. The deed in question she at one time alleged to
have been merely as security for loans. She received by compromise $2000 of the insurance money on the property, and the
evidence certainly is that she received that money as a full settlement of all her claims, and agreed to reconvey the property.
Whether she ever was formally married to General Jones or not,
she certainly occupied a very intimate confidential relation to
him; and it is settled beyond controversy by the authorities cited
in the opinion of the learned president of the court below, that it
is sufficient to invalidate any instrument, executed for an inadequate
consideration by a person of weak intellect, to show that the person in whose favor it is framed held a situation of confidence with
respect to the maker of such an instrument.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.
Where a deed or otier contract is

sought to be set aside on the ground of
the insanity of the maker, no fraud or
undue influence being alleged, the test
is, had the maker sufficient mind to
comprehend, in a reasonable manner,
the nature and effect of what he was
doing? If he had, the instrument is
valid, if he had not, it is voidable:
Blakeley v. Blakeley, 33 N. J. :Eq. 502.
Ball v. ikMannin, 3 Bligh (N. S.) 1;
s. c. Smith & B. 183: 1 Dow & C.
380; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H.
531; Young v. Stevem, 48 Id. 135;
Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen I; Somers v.
Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231; Hovey v.
Chase, 52 Me. 304; Hovey v. H7obson,
55 Id. 256; Darby v. Haylford, 56 Id.
246" Coleman v. Rrazer, 3 Bush (Ky.)

300 ; Carpenterv. Carpenter, 8 Id. 283;
C owther v. Rowlandson, 27 Cal. 381
Mfiller v. Craig, 36 Il1. 110; Baldwin
v. Dunton, 40 Id. 188; Clearwater v.
Kinder, 43 Id. 272; Sheldon v. THarding, 44 Id. 68; Wiley v. Ewalt, 66 Id.
26; Aiman v. Stout, 42 Penn. St. 123;
Noel v. Karper, 53 Id. 97; Lozear v.
Shields, 23 N. J. Eq. 509; Dicken v.
Johnson, 7 Gceo. 491 ; Tolson v. Garner,
15 lo. 498; Burnham v. Mitchell, 34
Wis. 136.
Mere weakness of mind does not, in
the absence of fraud, imposition or undue influence, disable a man from conveying property, if the capacity remains
to see things in their true relations, and
to form correct conclusions. If, however, the mind is so impaired that the
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memory cannot recall the necessary
facts, nor the judgment be exercised in
drawing just conclusions, the power of
disposing of property is gone: Dennett
v. Denizett, supra. See also Miller v.
Craig, supra; Aiman v. Stout, supra;
Simonton v. Bacon, 49 Miss. 582; Henderson v. McGregor, 30 Wis. 80 ; Cain
v. Warford, 33 Ald. 23; Cadwalladerv.
Iest, 48 'Mo. 483; Killian v. Badgett,
27 Ark. 166 ; Maddox v. Simmons, 31
Geo. 528; Fornam v. Brooks, 9 Pick.
212; Wilson v. Oldham, 12 B. Mon.
60; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wins. 130.
It seems clear upon principle and it is
accordingly held that the unsoundness
of mind requisite to vitiate a contra~t
must exist at the time of making the
contract: Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind.
39; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 8 Bush
(Ky.) 283; Staples v. Wellington, 58
Me. 453; Stewart v. Redditt, 3 Mid. 81.
Nort only must the insanity exist at the
time of making the contract, but the
contract, when sought to be set aside on
the ground of insanity alone, whether
general or partial, must be shown to be
the offspring of mental disease : Blakeleg v. Blakeley, supra; Wray v. Wray,
32 Ind. 126 ; Staples v. Wellington,
supra. Monomania in no way connected
with the subject of the contract will not
vitiate it: Boyce v. Smith, 9 Gratt.
704; 1 Redf. on Wills 85. See also,
Dew v. Clark, 1 Addams 279 ; 3 Id. 79;
Lemon v. Jenkins, 48 Geo. 313.
Where, however, it appears in proof
that a person was at any given time of
unsound mind (unless from some temporary or transient cause), thelegal presumption is, that that state of mind
continues until the contrary is made to
appear by evidence. But to have this
effect, such unsoundness must be habitual : People v. Francis, 38 Cal. 183;
Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 39 ; Dicken v.
.Tohnson, 7 Gceo. 484; Haynes v. Swann,
6 Heisk. 560; -.Thornton v. Appleton, 29
Ale. 300; Trish v. Newell, 62 Il1. 196 ;
Armstrong v. Timmnons, 3 Harrington 345;
Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa 60 ; Wrag v.

Wray, 33 Ala. 187; Cook v. Cock, 53
Barb. 180; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 8
Bush 283.
Where the diseased condition of mind is temporary, continued
insanity or want of capacity is never
presumed: Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra; State v. Reddick, 7 Ran. 151 ;
People v. Francis, supra; Staples v.
Wellington, supra.
In the principal case upon the proceedings de lunatico inquirendo, it was found
that the grantor was a lunatic and incapable of managing his estate, and further,
that he had been so, with lucid intervals,
for twenty years. After general insanity is shown to exist in order to establish the validity of an act alleged to have
been done in a lucid interval, the proof
of such lucid interval must be clear: In
re Gangwere's Estate, 14 Penn. St. 417 ;
Dodge v. Meech, 1 Hagg. Ec. 620.
And it is not sufficient that there is evidence of sanity before and after the day
on which the act was done, there being
no presumption that a lucid interval will
continue: Harden v. Hays, 9 Penn. St.
151. It cannot, therefore, be claimed
that the act in question in the principal
case was done in a lucid interval, even
though there was no direct evidence of
the existence of insanity at the time the
deed in question was executed. The
presumption of the continuance of insanity once shown to exist would, in the
absence of opposing evidence, be sufficient evidence of the existence of insanitv at the time of the -execution of the
deed. And even if there were no such
presumption, proof that the deed was
referable to the precedent insane state of
mind, seems clearly sufficient to establish the continued existence and influence of such state of mind.
Independently, therefore, ,of the other points in
the case, as to the correctness of the
decision of which there can be no
question, the decision of the court upon
the question of insanity involved in the
case seems to be unquestionably correct.
MARSHALL D. EwELL.

Chicago.
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United States Circuit Court, -Districtof lffassachusetts.
CHARLES LARNED v. LAROY F. GRIFFIN.
Parties and witnesses attending in good faith any legal tribunal, with or without
a writ of protection, are privileged from arrest on civil process during their attendance, and for a reasonabic time in going and returning, and this protection extends
to parties and witnesses attending before arbitrators, commissioners or examiners.
This privilege can be enforced by plea in abatement.
The privilege is not waived either by submitting to the arrest and giving a bail
bond or by filing an answer to the merits with the plea of abatement.

DEmURiER to plea in abatement. The facts are sufficiently
stated in the opinion which was delivered by
CoLT, J.-In this case it appears that the defendant was arrested
while in Boston, Massachusetts, in. attendance before a commissioner acting under a commission issued out of the Superior Court
for Cook county, Illinois, to take the depositions of certain witnesses in a case pending in that court between the same parties,
and for the same cause of action as this suit. The defendant
submitted to the arrest and gave bail. The suit was first brought
in the State court, and afterwards duly removed here. The only
question now before the court, is whether the plea in abatement,
setting up the privilege of the defendant from arrest can be
sustained. To decide this, we must determine, 1st, whether the
defendant was privileged from arrest at the time; 2d, whether his
remedy can be enforced by a plea in abatement; 3d, whether
submitting to the arrest and giving a bail bond, is a waiver of the
privilege; 4th, whether answering to the merits is a waiver of the
plea in abatement.
It has long been settled that parties and witnesses attending in
good faith any legal tribunal, with or without a writ of protection,
are privileged from arrest on civil process during their attendance,
and for a reasonable time in going and returning : Thompson's Case
122 Mass. 428; In re Healey, 53 Vt. 694; Huddeson v. Prizer,
9 Phila. 65; -Ex pcarte Hurst, I Wash. C. C. 186; Juneau Bank
eStpedan, 5 Bis. 64. Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. Rep. 17,
v.
43; Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124; Bacon's Ab., Privilege,
B. 2; Meekins v. 'Smith, 1 H. Black. 636; 1 Greenl. on Ev.,

§ 316.
And this protection extends to the attendance of parties and
witnesses before arbitrators, commissioners and examiners : Spence
v. Stuart, 3 East 89; Arding v. Flower, 8 D. & E. 534; San-
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ford v. chtase, 3 Cow, 381; United States v. Edme, 9 S. & R.
147; .tuddeson v. Prizer,9 Phila. 65; Wetherill v. Seitzinger, 1
Miles 237; Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. Rep. 17, 43; 1 Greenl.
on Ev., § 319.
It is clear, therefore, that the defendant was privileged from
arrest at the time it was made. But whether his remedy is by
plea in abatement, is less free from doubt. Under the old English
rule, this immunity was taken advantage of by writ of privilege.
"The only way by which courts of justice could anciently take
cognisance of privilege of parliament, was by writ of privilege, in
the nature of a supersedeas to deliver the party out of custody
when arrested in a civil suit. But, since the Statute of 12 Win.
III., c. 3, which'enacts that no privileged person shall be subject
to arrest or imprisonnient, it hath been held that such arrest is
irregular, ab initio, and that the party may be discharged upon
motion :" 1 Black. Com. 166.
The more modern way in England has been to raise the question
either by motion or by plea in abatement: Pitt's Case, 3 Stra.
985; Cameron v. Lightfoot, 2 W. Bl. 1190 ; X]eekins v. Smith,
1 I. Bl. 636; Randall v. Gurney, 3 B. & Ald. 252; Com. Dig.,
Abatement, D. 6; 1 Chit. P1. 443; -Davies v. Rendleshan, 7
Taunt. 679.
In this country, the right of privilege has been brought before
the court in three ways. By motion: .Exparte Hurst, 1 Wash.
186; Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McLean 29, 41; Juneau Bank v.
3feSpedan, 5 Bis. 64; Sanford v. Ctase, 3 Cow. 381; Seaver v.
Bobinson, 3 Duer 622; Ilarrisv. Grantham, Coxe (N. J.) 142;
Starrett's Vase, 1 Dall. 356; Hammerscold v. Bose, 7 Jones (Law)
629; tnter v. LOeveland, 1 Brev. 168; H1enegar v. Spangler,
29 Geo. 217. By habeas corpus: Ex parte A1'N eil, 6 Mass.
245; Wood v. Neale, 5 Gray 538; 13ay! v. Shumway, 16 Id.
86; .Richards v. Goodson, 2 Va. Cases 381 By plea in abatement: King'v. Coit, 4 Day 129; Case v. Borabacher,15 Mich.
537 ; Julio v. Bolles, 22 Law Rep. 354; Gilbert v. Vanderpool,
15 Johns. 242; Anderson v. Rountree, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 115;
£1haffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 261, 265; Hoppin v. Jenekes, 8 R. I.
453. It is Bontended by the plaintiff that the common-law privilege of suitors and witnesses never extended so far as to abate the.
suit, however different the rule may be in case of members of
parliament, ambassadors and attorneys.
VOL. XXX.-85
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Anciently, it would seem in all cases of privilege, the supersedeas which was granted upon a writ of privilege, only operated to
deliver the party out of custody, and he was still held upon common
bail : Long's Case, 2 Mod. 181; Pitt's Case, 2 Stra. 987; 1 Black.
Com. 166. But after the Statute of 12 Win. III., c. 3, it
was decided in Col. Pitt's Case, 2 Stra. 987, that members of
parliament, or those entitled to privilege of parliament, should be
discharged absolutely, and not upon common bail: See also,
Ca4sidy v. Stuart, 12 Ad. & R. 450. The rule, however, with
respect to suitors and witnesses, was still maintained, that while
the arrest would be set aside, common bail must be filed the suit
did not abate: Cameron v. Lightfoot, 2 W. Bl. 1190.
The early decisions in this country are not harmonious. In
some of the older cases, the rule was followed that the privilege
of suitors and'witnesses extends no further than exemption from
arrest, that service by summons is legal, and that in cases of arrest
common bail must be filed, or a general appearance entered: Blight
v. Fisher, Peters 0. 0. 41; Hunter v. Cleveland, 1 Brev. 168;
Taft v. Hoppin, Anthon N. P. 187 ; Booraem v. Wheeler, 12 Vt.
311 ; and the more recent case of Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1.
In other cases, however, we find the right extended, and a more
complete protection afforded suitors and witnesses, the discharge
from arrest being absolute, and service by summoni held illegal-:
HJayes v. Shields, 2 Yeates 222; Miles v. XeCullough, 1 Binn.
76 ; United States v. BEdme, 9 S. & R. 147 ; Norris v. Beach, 2
Johns. 294; Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; Harrisv. Grantham,
1 Coxe 142.
Whatever may have been the earlier view, we have no 'doubt that
the tendency in this country has been to enlarge the right of privilege
so as to afford full protection to suitors and witnesses from all forms
of process of a civil character during their attendance before any
judicial tribunal, and for a reasonable time in going and returning.
Let us pursue the subject a little further. The case of Blqht v.
Fisher, Pet. C. C. 41, decided in 1809, by Justice WASHINGTON,
holding that a service of summons upon a witness is good, is distinctly overruled in the later case of Parkerv. Hotehkiss, 1 Wall.
Jr. 269, the court stating that the opinion met with the approval
of Chief Justice TANEY and Justice GREER. See also the elaborate opinion in Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McLean 29, to the effect that
a judge about to start on his circuit is not liable to be served with
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summons, his privilege being as extensive as that of a suitor or
The same view'is expressed in
witness, or juror of the court.
Juneau Bank v. MLeSpedan, 5 Bis. 64; Bridqesv. Sheldon, 7 Fed.
Rep. 17, 43.
In the earlier cases in New York a distinction was taken between
resident and non-resident suitors and witnesses. In the case of nonresidents, an absolute discharge was granted : INorris v. Beach, 2
Johns. 294. But in the case of residents, common bail had to be
given: Bours v. Tuekerman, 7 Johns. 538.
Referring to these two decisions in Sanford v. Ohase, 3 Cowen
381, the court"observe, " We adopt the first case; the privilege of
In the recent case of Person v.
a witness should be absolute."
Grier,66 N. Y. 124, the court declare that any distinction between
residents and non-residents is doubtful, and the broad ground is
taken that this immunity is one of the necessities of the administration of justice, and that courts would often be embarrassed if
suitors or witnesses while attending court could be molested with
process: Seaver v. Robinson, 3 Duer 622 ; Merrill v. George, 23
How. Pr. 331.
The case of Taft v. Hoppin (1816), Anthon 187, which decided
that the defendant, a non-resident suitor, should be held upon common bail, was rendered at Nisi Prius, and in view of the prior case
of Norris v. Beach, 2 Johns. 294, and of the subsequent decisions
in the highest court of the state, it can hardly be deemed authority.
In Pennsylvania, from an early period complete immunity seems
to have been extended to suitors and witnesses : Miles v. McCullough, 1 Binn. 77; -Hayesv. Shields, 2 Yeates 222; United States.
v. .Edme, 9 S. & R. 147; Holmes v. N'elson, 1 Phila. 217. "It
is alike the privilege of the person and the privilege of the court.
It renders the administration of justice free and untrammelled, and
protects from improper interference all who aie concerned in it,"
say the court in Huddeson v. Prizer,9 Phila. 65.
In New Jersey, also, a full discharge is granted: Harris v.
G'antharn, 1 Coxe 142.
In Massachusetts it was held by Judge MoI'ToN in Julio v. Bolles,
12 Law Rep. 354, that a foreign witness was protected from summons.
In that case a plea in abatement had been filed which uas demurred
to by the plaintiff. In overruling the demurrer, the learned judge
observes, "If this service was illegal, the jurisdiction fails, and the
writ should be abated."
In Vermont, we are referred by plaintiff's counsel, to the case of
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Booraem v. Wheeler, 12 Vt. 311, which holds a plea in abatement
bad in the case'of a witness arrested while attending court; the
court maintaining that it has never been held that a man's property
may not be attached, or he be served with a summons while attending court as a witness or suitor; what is wanted is that the suitor
or witness may give uninterrupted attendance at court ; that this
object is not secured by abating the writ, for the question may not
be heard until long after the court he was attending had closed its
session; the legal object can be, andalways has been better secured
by the summary proceeding of a motion to the court to release the
person for the time being or by habeas corpus.
But the views here expressed of the extent of the privilege of
suitors or witnesses, are clearly inconsistent with the later 'case in
Vermont of In re HFealey (1881), 53 Vt. 694, which declares a service by summons upon a witness to be illegal. The court, citing
.Personv. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124, and other cases, remark, "In the
case of a non-resident suitor or witness, the weight of authority is
to the effect that the immunity is absolute from the service of any
process, unless the case is exceptional," And it is further declared
that if the writ had been made returnable to that court it would
have been dismissed upon motion ; the court would not have taken
jurisdiction of a party whose rights were thus invaded, for to do so
would be in effect a withdrawal of the shield and protection which
the law uniformly gives to witnesses.
Whether this plea in abatement shall be sustained or not, turns
upon the view taken of the extent and character of the privilege
•to which suitors and witnesses are entitled. If we adopt the older
and narrower view, that this is wholly the privilege of the court
rather than of the suitor, and therefore a question of judicial discretion rather than of personal right; and further, that while the
offender may be punishable for contempt, if the arrest is made in
the actual or constructive presence of the court, still the suitor or
witness can only ask to have the arrest set aside upon giving common bail, or entering a general appearance, then the suit does not
abate, and the present plea is bad.
But if we adopt the broader rule, which it appears to us is clearly
warranted by the more recent decisions in the federal and state
courts, and which in our opinion is necessary to the due administrafion of justice, that -this immunity extends to all kinds of civil process, and affords an absolute protection, then we see no good reason
why a plea in abatement is not proper here, as in other cases of

